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In this Essay we first address the meaning of the assertion that
the law is male and argue that the claim encompasses three observa-
tions. In the second half, we apply these ideas about the maleness of
the law to the problem of determining standards for the resolution of
child custody disputes. We conclude that the law is indeed male, that
there are some important virtues to the "maleness" of law and that
those male strengths should be deployed to help women, as well as
men.
The first and most obvious way in which the law is male is that
historically, and today, it systemically favors men and oppresses wo-
men. "[Ojur Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex
discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by
an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put
women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage."' The feminist movement of
the 1970s, under the legal leadership of our newest Supreme Court
Justice, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, was substantially successful in challeng-
ing explicit gender bias.2 Nonetheless, as with race, the law has been
less willing to grapple with rules that are neutral in form but discrimi-
natory in effect.3 In short, the law is male because the substance of its
rules systemically favors men and disfavors women.
Second, the law is male in that its principles-justice, abstract
rules, predictability, autonomy-apply to the public (male) worlds of
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1. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
2. See Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 969-83
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3. See, e.g., Feeney v. Personnel Administrator, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (involving gender);
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market and politics, while premodern customary expectations of care
and concern apply in the private (female) worlds of home and family. 4
The third facet of the claim that the law is male rests on Carol
Gilligan's observations about gender-based tendencies in patterns of
moral reasoning.5 In a classic experiment a boy and a girl-Jake and
Amy-are asked to reason about whether a man without money
should steal the drugs his wife needs to live. 6 For Jake the answer is
clear, hierarchical and rule bound. Life is more important than prop-
erty.7 For Amy the problem is more complex. If the man steals the
drugs, maybe he will go to jail and that would not be good for anyone.
Maybe the man could appeal to the druggist's humanity and persuade
him to give his wife the drugs. Amy seeks to place the problem in a
complex, messy human context. She wants to change the hypotheti-
cal.8 She flunks moral reasoning.9
4. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983); Kathryn L. Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Directions
of Sex Discrimination Law, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 55.
5. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982).
6. Id. at 26-39.
7. Gilligan explains that:
Constructing the dilemma, as Kohlberg did, as a conflict between the values of property
and life, [Jake] discerns the logical priority of life and uses that logic to justify his
choice.... Fascinated by the power of logic, this eleven-year-old boy locates truth in
math, which, he says, is "the only thing that is totally logical." Since his solution is
rationally derived, he assumes that anyone following reason would arrive at the same
conclusion and thus that a judge would also consider stealing to be the right thing for
[the man] to do.
Id. at 26-27.
8. Gilligan explains that:
Seeing in the dilemma not a math problem with humans but a narrative of relationships
that extends over time, Amy envisions the wife's continuing need for her husband and
the husband's continuing concern for his wife and seeks to respond to the druggist's
need in a way that would sustain rather than sever connection. Just as she ties the
wife's survival to the preservation of relationships, so she considers the value of the
wife's life in a context of relationships, saying that it would be wrong to let her die
because, "if she died, it hurts a lot of people and it hurts her." Since Amy's moral
judgment is grounded in the belief that, "if somebody has something that would keep
somebody alive, then it's not right not to give it to them," she considers the problem in
the dilemma to arise not from the druggist's assertion of rights but from his failure of
response.
Id. at 28.
9. Gilligan explains that:
When considered in the light of Kohlberg's definition of the stages and sequence of
moral development, her moral judgments appear to be a full stage lower in maturity
than those of the boy .... As her reliance on relationships seems to reveal a continuing
dependence and vulnerability, so her belief in communications as the mode through
which to resolve moral dilemmas appears naive and cognitively immature.
Id. at 29.
Sylvia Law distributes the Jake and Amy story to first-year torts students, several weeks into
the semester. "I tell students that my job is mostly to make them think like Jake, to drum those
mushy Amy instincts out of them, and to help them to think like a lawyer. People, particularly
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Thus, the claim that the law is male encompasses at least three
distinct observations. This Essay addresses those claims in the context
of the specific problem of child custody disputes. The history and
present state of child custody law support the claim that the law is
male in each of the three ways identified above.
I. MALE LAW IS SYSTEMICALLY BIASED AGAINST WOMEN
Custcdy law-historically and today-systemically favors men.
The eighteenth and nineteenth century law explicitly favored men by
giving them the absolute right to custody of children as a form of chat-
tel.' 0 Historically, the law of child custody in the United States has
employed presumptions. Colonial America adopted the English com-
mon-law concept that a father was presumptively entitled to custody
of his children. After Independence, and throughout the eighteenth
century, and most of the nineteenth century, fathers enjoyed a nearly
absolute entitlement to custody of their children, unless the father was
proved clearly unfit, guilty of serious abuse of the child, or unable to
care for the child." The custody rule protecting the rights of the fa-
ther was not concerned with either parenting ability or children's in-
terests or desires.
In mid-nineteenth-century United States, a new custody rule of
decision that presumed that the mother should have custody of chil-
dren of "tender years" (i.e., under age seven) replaced the common-
law rule that granted custody to the father. The rationale of the rule
was that only the mother possessed qualities of love, patience, and
tenderness needed to care for and raise young children.' 2 At the same
time, courts continued to give custody of older children, especially
older boys, to the father. A father seeking custody of a young child
had to prove that the mother was unfit. Unfitness included proof of
adultery or intemperance.
women, find some comfort in the identification of a phenomena that has been disturbing to
them."
10. Historian Michael Grossberg describes the tradition of paternal possession and the suc-
cessful challenge to it in the late nineteenth century by feminist agitation, stressing the role that
mothers play in children's nurture. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND
FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 244-47 (1985). See also JEFF ATKINSON, MODERN
CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE 221 (1986); Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief
Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 235, 235-37
(1982).
11. JOHN P. MCCAHEY ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION LAW AND PRACTICE, 1-14
to 1-15.
12. Id. at 1-19.
1993]
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The maternal preference for custody of children of tender years,
while helping some women, implicitly favored men. It reinforced no-
tions that mothers are responsible for children and fathers are not.13
Further, when a father sought custody, the so-called maternal prefer-
ence was defeated on the flimsiest and most sex-biased showing of
maternal "unfitness.' 14
In the 1960s and 1970s, family law shifted away from fault-based
regimes to "no fault," which made divorce easier to obtain and, in
theory, less stigmatizing. The substantive rules for determining cus-
tody also changed, away from the maternal presumption to a gender-
neutral standard, articulated as "the best interest of the child." Advo-
cates of the "best interest" test claimed that it shifted focus away from
possessory rights of parents to the needs of the specific children.
In 1993, the overwhelming majority of states apply some version
of the "best interests of the child" standard. 15 While the title of the
test is identical among the states, the content of the "best interest" test
differs in each.
In some states, statutes specify the factors that trial courts should
consider in determining the best interests of the child.' 6 For example,
the Michigan Child Custody Act lists ten specific factors, and directs
judges that the:
"Best interests of the child" means the sum total of the following
factors to be considered, evaluated and determined by the court:
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between
the parties involved and the child.
13. See, e.g., Meinhardt v. Meinhardt, 111 N.W.2d 782, 784 (Minn. 1961) ("That there is no
substitute for the love, companionship, and guidance of a good mother hardly needs any argu-
ment."). Professor Mary Jo Frug observed that the rule of maternal preference "not only allo-
cate[s] disproportionately more child rearing responsibilities to women in formal legal disputes;
it also signal[s] to men and women making 'private' decisions regarding parenting responsibili-
ties that the legal system expect[s] women to do more parenting and to do it better than men."
A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1060
(1992).
14. Judge Richard Neely of the West Virginia Supreme Court observes:
In application, the rule of maternal preference allowed judges substantial leeway to
take a mother's fault into consideration in the award of custody. It was frequently the
case, therefore, that sexual "promiscuity" (a term that tends to mean different things
when applied to women than to men, with women getting the short end of the double
standard) on the part of the woman would cause a court to declare her "unfit."
Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 168, 170 (1984).
15. IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW 498-99 (2d ed. 1991).
16. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (West 1990). Statutes are summarized in ELL-
MAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 498-99.
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(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the
child love, affection, guidance and continuation of the educating
and raising of the child in its religion or creed, if any.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide
the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care
recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of
medical care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home or homes.
(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.
(h) The home, school and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the
child to be of sufficient age to express preference.
() The willingness and ability of each of the parents to facilitate
and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship be-
tween the child and the other parent.
(k) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a
particular child custody dispute. 17
In contrast, New York State's statutory "best interest" test is de-
fined to require that:
[Tihe court must give such direction, between the parties, for the
custody and support of any child of the parties, as, in the court's
discretion, justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of
the case and of the respective parties and to the best interests of the
child. In all cases there shall be no prima facie right to the custody
of the child in either parent.18
A recent New York appellate division decision explains that the fol-
lowing factors should be considered in determining the best interests
of the child:
(1) the continuity and stability of the existing custodial arrange-
ment, including the relative fitness of the parents and the length of
time the present custodial arrangement has continued; (2) quality of
the child's home environment and that of the parent seeking cus-
tody; (3) the ability of each parent to provide for the child's emo-
tional and intellectual development; (4) the financial status and
ability of each parent to provide for the child; (5) the individual
17. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.23. The Michigan statute has been interpreted to require
that custody judges state a conclusion on each of the ten factors. A summary statement that all
factors have been considered is not sufficient. Truitt v. Truitt, 431 N.W.2d 454, 458 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1988).
18. N.Y. DOM. REL. § 240 (Consol. 1993).
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needs and expressed desires of the child; and (6) the need of the
child to live with siblings.19
Cases tried under a "best interest" standard usually require expert tes-
timony because the underlying facts are not easily observed. Evi-
dence of the psychological status of the parties and children, parental
capacity and willingness to promote a relationship with a former
spouse, and other factors is necessary. The "best interest" test in-
volves many facts and factors that are interdependent and unique to
the circumstances of the particular family. It requires a prediction
about the future rather than an evaluation of the family relations prior
to the breakup. The "best interest" standard favors the party with the
greatest resources to mount an expert-based claim.20 In most cases
that is the man.
Further, the "best interest" standard is extremely vague and un-
predictable. Vagueness and uncertainty in custody standards work to
the advantage of the party who is less committed to maintaining cus-
tody, typically the man.21 Mothers give up solid legal claims to marital
property or child support to resist the man's "Brer Rabbit" claim to
custody.22 A law that systemically forces women to give up honest
economic claims to care for their children is biased against women.23
The vagueness and uncertainty of the "best interest" standard
vests tremendous discretion in trial court judges. Trial court determi-
nations under the "best interest" standard typically review evidence
and conclude, "on the basis of all the facts and evidence before me, I
19. Fox v. Fox, 582 N.Y.S.2d 863, 864 (App. Div. 1992) (citations omitted). The same appel-
late court in the same state had earlier formulated the factors for determining parental fitness as
"his or her financial status, capacity to provide for the children's emotional and intellectual de-
velopment, and inclination to encourage regular contact with the noncustodial parent that is the
joint right of the children and the other parent." Mahoney v. Mahoney, 521 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588
(App. Div. 1987). Another appellate court in New York identified as factors only the "quality of
the home environment, the need for stability in a child's life and the relative fitness of the re-
spective parents." Lynn W. v. Guy C., 519 N.Y.S.2d 400, 401 (App. Div. 1987) (citations omit-
ted) (involving custody of out-of-wedlock child).
20. See Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705,712-13 (Minn. 1985); Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d
357, 362 (W. Va. 1981).
21. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 978-79 (1979); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudica-
tion: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (1975);
Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615, 653-
54 (1992).
22. Mnookin, supra note 21 (arguing that psychological theories cannot accurately predict
the effects of alternate custody determinations and arguing for less discretionary custody award
standards).
23. See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in
Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988); David L. Chambers, Rethinking
the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1984); Jon Elster,
Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CH. L. REv. 1 (1987).
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find that the best interest of the child will be served by ... " Such a
conclusory judgment is effectively unreviewable on appeal. Unfet-
tered discretion permits judges (usually older, white males) to incor-
porate their own personal history, experience and bias in adding
content to the "best interest" principles.
In most states, the standard for appellate review of trial court cus-
tody determination is "abuse of discretion" or even higher.24 Because
the most important factors in a "best interest" determination involve a
trial court's observations of the parties, the appellate court has no ob-
jective way to find that the trial court committed error except in the
most egregious case. 25 Thus few custody cases are appealed and the
absence of appellate decisions reinforces trial court discretion. Even
in the rare cases where custody judgements are appealed, they are
rarely reversed. A study completed in the early 1980s found that trial-
court custody decisions were reversed on appeal only eighteen percent
of the time.26
We argue that the law of custody systemically favors men despite
the fact that most divorcing parents agree that children should stay
with their mothers.27 Often it is convenient for the father to leave the
kids with the mother. Usually this coincides with the mother's placing
a high value on maintaining custody because she has deep connections
to her children.
II. MALE LAW FAILS TO PAY ATFENTION TO VITAL ISSUES OF
FAMILY
The law of custody embodies the notion that the public law of
politics and markets is important, while the private law of the family is
not. No one pays much attention to family law, including the vital
issues of child custody. Even though family law cases constitute the
largest category of filings at the trial court level, appellate considera-
tion of family disputes is relatively rare. 28 In part, the absence of re-
24. For example, the Kansas Supreme Court held that custody decisions will be upheld
unless "no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court." Stayton v. Stayton,
506 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Kan. 1973).
25. Osteraas v. Osteraas, 859 P.2d 948, 950 (Idaho 1993).
26. Jeff Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts, 18
FAM. L.Q. 1, 39 (1984).
27. See the data summarized in ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 508-09.
28. In 1991, family law cases were the largest single category of civil filings and trials at the
trial court level (33%), as compared with tort (10%), contract (14%), real property (10%). CON-
FERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS, THE STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE, AND THE NA-
TIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT,
1991, at 15 (1993). However, family law cases constitute a very small portion of the docket of
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view is a function of the indeterminacy and fact-specificity of the "best
interest" standard.29 But the question of appropriate standards is
well-suited to appellate and legislative determination. In most juris-
dictions, neither the courts nor the legislatures have grappled with
custody standards in recent years.30
When courts or legislatures do address the principles for adjudi-
cating child custody disputes, they often act without close attention to
factual complexity, empirical evidence, or respect for generally pre-
vailing principles of lawmaking. For example, in the 1970s, courts
rushed to adopt the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit theory that exclusive
custody should be awarded to the "psychological parent," with little
serious attention to the lack of evidentiary or ethical support for the
psychological parent theory.31
A second example of thoughtless action in the custody area oc-
curred in the 1980s when several jurisdictions adopted a strong prefer-
ence for joint custody.32 Again, the presumption for joint custody was
adopted without careful attention to empirical evidence or diversity of
factual situations.33 Much evidence supports the notion that joint cus-
tody is the best arrangement in ideal circumstances, 34 but successful
joint custody requires proximity, communication, and the resources to
appellate courts. See Margaret P.P. Mason, Note, Courting Reversal: The Supervisory Role of
State Supreme Courts, 87 YALE L.J. 1191, 1210 (1978). See generally Gary Crippen, Stumbling
Beyond Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of
Minnesota's Four Year Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427,
431 n.15 (1990).
29. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 15.
30. See Crippen, supra note 28, at 434-38. Crippen reports that in Oregon in the late 1970s
and early 1980s a conflict on the role of the primary-caretaker principle arose in the intermediate
appellate courts. After describing this sharp conflict in legal rules, he notes, "[i]nexplicably, the
issue did not arise again in an Oregon appellate review after 1983." Id. at 438. Obviously hun-
dreds, perhaps thousands, of child custody disputes have arisen in Oregon since 1983. One fac-
tor explaining the lack of appellate resolution of the governing legal principles may be that
litigants in family disputes, and particularly mothers, lack the resources to pursue appeals. An-
other probable factor is that the "law" does not regard these issues as important.
31. Peggy Davis, "There is a Book Out...': An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legisla-
tive Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1543-44 (1987).
32. The history is summarized in Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428, 431 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
33. Franklin E. Zimring reports that joint custody was adopted:
[W]ith no public commitment or private initiative for the systematic assessment of the
legal changes on patterns of custody or on child welfare. As fashions change and new
interest groups emerge, family law is at risk of becoming a series of experiments that
never report results in ways that can help inform the legislative process.
Franklin E. Zimring, Foreword to DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS (Stephen D.
Sugarman & Herma Kays eds., 1990).
34. JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How CHIL-
DREN AND PARENTS COPE wrrH DIVORCE (1980); Katharine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint
Custody, Feminism and the Dependency Dilemma, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 41 (1986).
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support two homes for a child. Most divorcing couples are not blessed
with these necessary requisites to successful joint custody. 35
More specifically, the rush to adopt presumptions in favor of psy-
chological parents, and then presumptions in favor of joint custody,
failed to consider the adverse impact that these standards predictably
have on most mothers. The psychological parent standard demands
the services of high-priced experts and hence implicitly favors the
party better able to pay for these services.36 Joint custody adversely
impacts on women because it diminishes their bargaining power and
forces them to make financial concessions in order to avoid it.37
The unreflective rush to adopt these presumptions can best be
understood as a failure to attach importance to-and pay attention
to-the critical issues that custody law poses. The pattern follows a
tradition of devaluing the private, the family, and concerns associated
with women.
III. AMY, JAKE, AND THE LAW OF CUSTODY
The law of custody allows us to make some complex observations
about the Jake/Amy vision of the law as male or female. In Gilligan's
terms, the observation that the law is male critiques the law as exces-
sively rule bound, deductive, individualistic, and insensitive to the par-
ticularity of complex human relations. In Jake and Amy terms,
traditional family law is, for the most part, female. It rests on very
Amy-like concepts such as "the best interests of the child." Amy-like
concepts of discretion, altruism, and connection prevail in the law of
the family, while the law of the public sphere is seen as more appro-
priately governed by clear rules, individualism, and deduction.
While the general structure of family law is Amy-like, in applica-
tion it favors men.3 8 Predominately male judges, exercising discretion
35. Joan B. Kelly, Further Observations on Joint Custody, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 762
(1983); Susan Steinman, Joint Custody: What we Know, What we Have Yet to Learn, and the
Judicial and Legislative Implications, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 739 (1983).
36. See Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 712-13 (Minn. 1985); Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d
357, 362 (W. Va. 1981).
37. Joanne Schulman & Valerie Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Child Custody: Analysis of
Legislation and Its Implications for Women and Children, 12 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 538, 550-
55 (1982); Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455,
477-81 (1984).
38. As another example, the law of child support traditionally used the Amy-like standard
of "fair and equitable financial support for children." Discretionary levels of child support left
women and children destitute, while the financial situation of men improved substantially after
divorce. LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCE FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985). Traditional family
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to determine the best interest of the child, are far more empathetic to
men in contested disputes. Thus the influence of feminist insight has
led many family law scholars to advocate hard-edged Jake-like rules
for the resolution of family disputes.39 Many feminists urge adoption
of a primary-caretaker presumption for the resolution of child custody
disputes.
A primary-caretaker standard asks who, in the predivorce house-
hold, performed the following tasks:
(a) planning, preparing meals;
(b) bathing, grooming, dressing children;
(c) purchasing, cleaning clothing;
(d) providing medical care;
(e) transporting to afterschool or social Activities-interacting with
teachers, friends;
(f) arranging for alternative childcare (i.e., babysitters);
(g) putting children to bed, waking children in the morning;
(h) tending to children in middle of night;
(i) disciplining children;
(j) educating children in religion and culture; and
(k) teaching skills.40
The primary-caretaker standard is more objective. It looks to past
conduct ascertainable by nonexpert testimony. Litigation under the
primary-caretaker presumption resembles typical civil or commercial
litigation. It is a more Jake-like standard. The primary-caretaker pre-
sumption articulates a bright-line rule that children should remain in
the custody of the parent that does the concrete tasks of taking care of
them. In contemporary culture, it is a rule that in most cases favors
women, whether or not they work outside the home.41 Further, it is a
law illustrates that in a deeply patriarchal culture it is dangerous to rely on discretionary rules
that allow individual judges to determine what is fair in particular situations.
39. See infra note 41. Mandatory Jake-like child support guidelines provide another exam-
ple of feminist influence to seek male rules to govern family relations. Mandatory support
guidelines produce support payments that, in the recent past, could be challenged as confiscatory
by the noncustodial parent asserting Amy-like claims of fairness. See Irvin Garfinkel &
Marygold S. Melli, The Use of Normative Standards in Family Law Decisions: Developing Mathe-
matical Standards for Child Support, 24 FAM. L.Q. 157 (1990).
40. Such a standard was applied, for example, in Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 713
(Minn. 1985); and Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981). See also Gibson v.
Gibson, 304 S.E.2d 336, 338 (W. Va. 1983).
41. MARY A. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 132 (1981); Elizabeth
Maret & Barbara Finlay, The Distribution of Household Labor Among Women in Dual-earner
Families, 46 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 357, 360 (1984) (showing that even when women work full-
time they typically assume primary responsibility for child care); Scott & Derdeyn, supra note
[Vol. 69:345
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rule that reduces the advantage to the party with financial resources
because it does not require expert testimony.42 It limits judicial dis-
cretion, provides a larger measure of predictability to guide parties
negotiating in the shadow of the law, and provides a basis for appel-
late oversight.43 It does not reinforce classic gender stereotypes-
men who actually feed the kids, arrange their play dates, and put them
to bed qualify as primary caretakers.
While virtually all scholarly commentary supports the primary-
caretaker presumption, West Virginia is the only jurisdiction to fuliy
adopt it, and Minnesota for a brief period.44 Other states have not
"rejected" it. Rather, the core issue of principles for adjudicating cus-
tody-and the far more common problems that confront couples who
negotiate in the shadow of the law-simply does not rise to a level
that commands the attention of either appellate courts or legislatures.
IV. APPLICATION OF "BEST INTEREST" AND PRIMARY-
CARETAKER TO A DiFFICULT HYPOTHETICAL
We agree with most other observers that in bread-and-butter cus-
tody disputes the primary-caretaker standard generally provides a
37, at 460-61 (collecting data showing that the movement of women into the wage labor force has
not resulted in a corresponding increase in the amount of time men spend performing household
tasks or caring for children).
42. For a scholarly discussion of the use of expert testimony in child custody decisionmak-
ing, see Shelia R. Okpaku, Psychology: Impediment or Aid in Child Custody Cases?, 29
RUrGERS L. REV. 1117, 1144-50 (1976).
43. See Francis J. Catania, Jr., Accounting to Ourselves for Ourselves: An Analysis of Adju-
dication in the Resolution of Child Custody Disputes, 71 NEB. L. REV. 1228, 1260 (1992); Carol S.
Bruch, And How Are the Children? The Effects of Ideology and Medication on Child Custody
Law and Children's Well-Being in the United States, 2 Irr'L J.L. & FAM. 106, 108 (1988); Cham-
bers, supra note 23, at 480 (supporting primary-caretaker presumption for young children); Crip-
pen, supra note 28; Elster, supra note 23, at 34; Fineman, supra note 23, at 770-74 (arguing that
the primary-caretaker presumption should be extended to children of all ages); Martha L.
Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody Deter-
minations at Divorce, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 107, 121; Frank F. Furstenburg Jr., Divorce and the
American Family, 16 ArN. REV. Soc. 379, 384 (1990); Neely, supra note 14, at 180-86 (author of
Garska v. McCoy explaining West Virginia's standard); Dan O'Hanlon & Margaret Workman,
Beyond the Best Interest of the Child: The Primary Caretaker Doctrine in West Virginia, 92 W.
VA. L. REV. 355, 379 (1990); Marcia O'Kelly, Blessing the Tie that Binds: Preference for the
Primary Caretaker as Custodian, 63 N.D. L. REV. 481, 483 (1987) (complimenting North Dakota
Supreme Court Justice Levine's dissenting opinion advocating primary-caretaker standard); Poli-
koff, supra note 10, at 242; Laura Sack, Women and Children First: A Feminist Analysis of the
Primary Caretaker Standard in Child Custody Cases, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 291, 301 (1992);
Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615, 626
(1992); Rena K. Uviller, Fathers' Rights and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption Revisited, 1
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 107, 129 (1978) (arguing for a presumption in favor of the person "who has
committed herself to care for home and children [yielding] only to a showing that in fact it has
been the father who assumed that role during marriage").
44. Crippin, supra note 28, at 438.
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more objective, fact-oriented, nonexpert standard that appropriately
recognizes the importance of caretaking work. In many cases it will
be plain that one party-usually the mother-has assumed major re-
sponsibility for that work. In the easy cases, the relative clarity of the
primary-caretaker presumption will help to alleviate the pressure that
now leads women to give up legitimate economic claims to avoid the
risks of custody loss generated by the indeterminate and resource in-
tensive "best interest" standard.
However, many cases are not easy. In this section, we consider a
difficult case and explore the way that courts might approach it under
either the "best interest" or "primary-caretaker" standard:
HYPOTHETICAL: Alice and Jack were married in 1982 and gave
birth to a son, Sean, in 1983, and a daughter, Susan, in 1987. From
1982 until 1988, they lived together in Delaware. Jack worked
outside the home as a journeyman carpenter. Alice stayed home
and cared for the kids. In 1988, Jack was offered an opportunity to
work as a foreman on a large project in Abbott. He moved there,
leaving Alice and the children behind. Jack and Alice agreed that it
would help his work, and cause the children less disruption, if they
did not go with him. From 1988 to 1991, Jack paid less than $1,000
in child support. In 1989 Alice went to work as a waitress. In Octo-
ber 1991, Alice had fallen so far behind in her bills that she could no
longer care for the children. Since October 1991, Sean and Susan
have lived with their father. During most of this period, Jack has
been unemployed. He and the children have been supported by his
new companion, while he stays at home and cares for Sean, Susan
and the house. In December 1992, Jack filed for divorce, seeking
custody of the children. From 1988 to 1991, when the children lived
with Alice, they visited with their father for a week's vacation in the
summer and for several days over the Christmas holidays. For the
past two years, the children have had similar visits with their
mother.45
Under a "best interest" standard, it is impossible to predict who
will win custody because the facts as presented do not provide evi-
dence of the present mental and emotional state of each parent. How-
ever, as a practical matter, Alice's financial circumstances make it
highly unlikely that she will be able to pay the lawyers and experts
needed to establish a "best interest" claim.
Putting aside the resource question, under the "best interest" test
either custody result is possible, even within the same state. In a "best
interest" jurisdiction, parental fault is relevant. But where is the fault
in this case? The father failed to pay support, but the mother "aban-
45. This problem is adapted from Dempsey v. Dempsey, 306 S.E.2d 230 (W. Va. 1983).
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doned" the children by sending them to the father. It is likely that the
determinative outcome of the "best interest" application will turn on
the juxtaposition of the father's failure to pay child support for three
years (which caused the impoverishment of the family) as against the
mother's action in "giving up the kids" to the father-and the judge's
personal reaction to each. But if giving up children is fault, did the
father give up the children first? 46
Many "best interest" jurisdictions give weight to the preference
of the child.47 In this case, what if the eight-year-old's stated prefer-
ence is to stay with Dad because his recollection of living with Mom is
a life of poverty as opposed to a middle-class lifestyle he now enjoys
with Dad? How does a judge weigh those factors? What if the daugh-
ter's preference is different? Is it irrelevant because she is too young?
"Best interest" standards often include both a preference to keep sib-
lings together and a preference to place an older child with a parent of
the same gender. These preferences are often flatly contradictory.
It is not easy to apply the primary-caretaker presumption in this
hypothetical case. First, it is not clear that there is one primary care-
taker.48 To what period of time does the court look in applying the
objective factors? The prior year of the child's life? Or the prior eight
years? Does the child's age matter in that regard? How, if at all, does
a judge consider failure to support as an element of parental fault?
What about failure to visit? Do either rise to a level of unfitness? If
not, are they at all relevant? Does it matter that the original primary-
caretaker arrangement would have continued but for the intervention
of the father's failure to support?
In the West Virginia case which forms the basis for this hypotheti-
cal, the court found no primary caretaker and, applying a "best inter-
est" standard, awarded custody to the father on the grounds that the
children had adjusted well to life with him. Judge Miller, dissenting,
protested:
[W]e pervert the principle of [Garska] if we permit a primary care-
taker to lose her favored role simply because her husband abandons
her and his child without any meaningful support, thereby forcing
her to give up custody of the child .... Presumably, if Mrs. Demp-
46. Some jurisdictions, including New York have doctrines that presume when a parent
leaves the household without the children, the departing parent consents to other parent's cus-
tody of the child(ren). Robert C.R. v. Victoria R., 532 N.Y.S.2d 176, 177 (App. Div. 1988);
Meirowitz v. Meirowitz, 466 N.Y.S.2d 434, 435 (App. Div. 1983).
47. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 532-34.
48. The West Virginia court found that there was no primary caretaker on these facts.
Dempsey, 306 S.E.2d at 231.
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sey had delivered temporary custody... to the ... Department of
Welfare, she could have avoided the problem. Because she chose a
more humane approach, she has now lost her child, a singularly in-
equitable result.49
CONCLUSION
The primary-caretaker presumption is not a panacea. Our prob-
lem illustrates that there are cases where it is not simple to apply a
clear rule. Further, experience in both West Virginia and Minnesota
suggests that the intended clarity of the rule often is undermined by
an expansive concept of parental unfitness under which a mother's
unconventional behavior is judged much more harshly than similar be-
havior on the part of a man.50 The rule will not operate in a predict-
able Jake-like fashion unless appellate courts are willing to insist that
lower courts make reviewable findings of fact.5'
Nonetheless, we believe that the primary-caretaker presumption
is an improvement over a "best interest" or psychological parent stan-
dard. In Gilligan's terms, the primary-caretaker presumption is a
Jake-like rule. Overall, the problems we confront in family law sup-
port the notion implicit in Gilligan's study: decisionmaking is inade-
quate if it is solely discretionary and primarily involves a judge's
personal beliefs about human relationships or solely based on clear
rules and inflexible principles. The goal must be to incorporate the
best of each.
49. Id. at 232.
50. Crippen, supra note 28, at 463; Sack, supra note 43, at 303.
51. Crippen, supra note 28, at 437-38.
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